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What Power Shift to China?
Guy de Jonquières
That economic and fi nancial power is shifting from West to East – and specifi cally to China – has become a mantra of our age, repeated so often and so insistently that it appears to 
be widely regarded as self-evident. Frequently, it is accompanied by the assertion China is set 
irreversibly on the path to global pre-eminence, if not outright domination. It is only a matter 
of time, it is sometimes suggested, before China rules the world.
Exactly what China’s power consists of, how it might be exercised and for what purposes are left 
tantalisingly unexplained. It seems simply to be assumed that such a populous country, whose economy 
has grown so big so fast, must have both the will and the capacity to impose its writ on the rest of the 
world. But that assumption, and the premises that underlie it, are highly questionable.
Undeniably, three decades of double-digit growth have given China impressive economic scale. 
It is the world’s second biggest economy, creditor nation and importer, its largest exporter and, by 
some measures, its most important manufacturing centre. It has the biggest current account surplus 
and foreign exchange reserves – at more than $3,000 billion, roughly one third of the global total. 
And it is the world’s biggest consumer of such commodities as aluminium, iron ore and copper.
However, those achievements need to be set in perspective. A hundred years ago, well before it became 
a global superpower, the US had already been the world’s biggest economy for a decade and accounted 
for a fi fth of world GDP, considerably more than twice as much as Germany and Britain, the next largest 
economies, combined. On the most generous purchasing power parity (PPP) measure, China’s GDP today 
is only two thirds that of the US – and less than half at nominal exchange rates – and its growth rate is 
set to slow in the coming years.
Furthermore US incomes a century ago were the highest in the world, almost 10 percent more than 
those of Britain, its closest rival. Chinese incomes today are barely one-sixth of the US level on a PPP 
basis, and only one tenth at nominal exchange rates, and ranks about 90th in the world league table. 
Relative to other countries, China now is a vastly poorer country than the US was then.
In any case, economic size does not, of itself, confer international infl uence. Japan, at its economic 
apogee in the 1980s, had the world’s second largest GDP, a huge current account surplus, bulging foreign 
exchange reserves and a world-beating manufacturing sector. Yet, despite widespread predictions that 
it was set to become a dominant power, it never translated those strengths into matching political or 
diplomatic infl uence, let alone leadership. And two centuries ago, when China was the world’s biggest 
economy, with a GDP larger than the whole of Western Europe, it was largely closed off from the world.
It is true that the West’s ability to infl uence China – insofar as it exists – is in decline. But that is as much 
because the fi nancial crisis of 2008 has sapped the West’s economic strength and moral authority as 
because of China’s rise. No longer is China prepared to be lectured by those who once treated it as a 
precocious pupil, when their own affairs are in disarray and when, in Europe’s case, they are looking to 
China to bail them out. 
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China’s success in riding out the crisis and the West’s 
economic weakness have inspired in it greater outward 
self-confi dence, sometimes even hubris. Beijing has 
been emboldened to stand its ground more fi rmly in 
dealings with the rest of the world, in both bilateral 
and multilateral forums, from climate change talks to 
the G20, the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Trade Organisation. If China was ever amenable 
to bullying or coercion, it is noticeably less so today. 
It is also ready to use economic pressure to get its 
way with smaller or more vulnerable countries – for 
example by insisting that South Africa dis-invite the 
Dalai Lama from Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s birthday 
celebrations last year.
Yet instances of China harnessing economic means to 
purely political ends are rare – and when it has tried 
to do so, it has often not succeeded: for instance, its 
attempts to get southern eurozone members to press 
Brussels to grant it Market Economy status in exchange 
for buying their debt have gone nowhere. Generally, 
China has proven a hesitant paymaster, apparently 
more interested in achieving secure prudential returns 
on its money than in using it to procure strategic 
geopolitical advantage. 
It has responded coolly to more recent pleas to lend 
more to the eurozone, insisting that its governments 
fi rst show they are serious about putting their fi nancial 
house in order. It has also displayed a strong preference 
for channelling any future fi nancial support through 
the IMF, rather than directly. This speaks not of a 
boisterous superpower eager to throw its weight 
about, but of an anxious investor wary of being sucked 
into a bewildering political and fi nancial minefi eld and 
keen to have others lead the way.
One area where Beijing has attempted, with mixed 
success, to use economic muscle is in domestic 
industrial policy. It has sought, for instance, to 
compel foreign companies to hand over proprietary 
technologies in exchange for access to its market 
and to give indigenous producers an edge by seeking 
to impose national technical standards. However, 
the clear aim of such policies is commercial, 
not political, gain.
Beyond its own borders, the defi ning feature of 
Chinese power is defensive: the power to say no. 
That is not unimportant, when needy sovereign 
borrowers outnumber well-heeled lenders and when 
China’s assent is essential to effective international 
cooperation in a growing number of fi elds. China 
is, however, strikingly reticent about contributing 
substantively to setting the global agenda, and even 
more so about plotting grand hegemonic strategies 
of the kind beloved of Western conspiracy theorists 
and some nationalistically-minded Chinese.
Such caution is in line with Deng Xiaoping’s much-
quoted injunction in international affairs to ‘stand 
fi rmly, hide our capabilities, bide our time, never try 
to take the lead’. Though Beijing has recently deviated 
dramatically from that axiom in some areas of foreign 
policy, notably in its aggressive – and spectacularly 
counter-productive – outbursts towards East Asian 
neighbours in 2010, Deng Xiaoping’s counsel of 
prudence continues to govern its economic and 
fi nancial dealings.
Indeed, the rationalism that has long informed China’s 
approach to economic affairs has repeatedly prevailed 
over recurrent pressures to give nationalism the upper 
hand in foreign policy. China’s leaders know that if 
sabre-rattling and brinkmanship are allowed to get 
out of control, they could swiftly backfi re, imperilling 
the stable international economic conditions on which 
the country’s welfare and prosperity – and crucially, 
the regime’s claims to legitimacy – hinge.
That is a point too often overlooked in discussion 
about China’s impact on the world economy. In reality, 
the world economy’s impact on China has been at 
least as great, if not greater. Indeed, in a number of 
respects, China today needs the West more than the 
West needs China. The most important is to generate 
demand and thereby growth.
China’s rise has benefi ted raw materials exporters 
worldwide, but its relatively low level of domestic 
consumption limits its market for many goods and 
services of the kind made in the West. However, 
the West’s markets still matter a lot to China. 
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The European Union is the biggest destination for its 
merchandise exports, accounting for roughly a fi fth 
of the total; yet China buys barely a tenth of extra-EU 
exports, and their value overtook those to Switzerland 
only in 2010. Much as Western politicians may carp 
about China’s surpluses on bilateral trade, they are 
actually a symptom of Chinese economic dependence.
CHINA’S FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
Five main objectives underlie China’s foreign 
economic policy, all of them heavily inspired by 
domestic concerns:
n Maintaining open world markets for its exports, 
more than half of which are produced by factories 
that are wholly or partly foreign-owned.
n Securing access to international supplies of 
energy and natural resources, to fuel the economy’s 
industrial development.
n Insulating the economy and national wealth from 
potentially destabilising external shocks.
n Acquiring new technologies, knowhow and skills.
n Promoting the global expansion of national 
industries through investment abroad.
Those objectives are not always pursued in a consistent 
manner. The formulation of foreign policy in any 
country is complex, shaped by the interplay of diverse 
pressures and interests. They are especially diffi cult to 
disentangle in China, both because policymaking is 
highly opaque and because recent years have seen a 
rapid expansion of the number of foreign policy actors, 
whose relative infl uence can vary from case to case. 
China’s global quest for energy and natural resources 
is a case in point. This is sometimes portrayed as a 
concerted state-led strategy to secure sources of 
supply. In reality, it is driven as much by the ambitions 
of state-owned companies and their top executives, 
which effectively control much of the relevant 
policymaking machinery, and by scarce reserves and 
tight price controls at home, which force them to look 
abroad for profi table growth.
A remarkably small proportion of resources that 
Chinese companies extract or produce abroad – 
as little as 10 percent, in the case of crude oil – is 
shipped back to China: most is swapped or sold on 
international markets. Furthermore, as latecomers, 
Chinese resources companies necessarily focus 
heavily on regions where their Western competitors 
are not already entrenched or are, for one reason or 
another, barred from operating. Since most resources 
are fungible, the effect of Chinese companies’ 
international expansion is not to ‘lock up’ supplies 
but, rather, to augment at the margin those available 
on world markets. That both casts in a different light 
scare stories about a supposed Chinese ‘takeover’ 
of resource-rich developing countries, and raises 
questions about the coherence of foreign policy.
Overall, China’s external economic dependence has 
induced prudence. Recurrent tensions with Tokyo 
have been contained by Beijing’s awareness of Japan’s 
importance as a trade partner and valued source of 
advanced technologies, capital goods and investment. 
Equally, China has been adept, so far at least, at 
telegraphing tactical concessions designed to defuse 
pressures in the US Congress for trade sanctions over 
its exchange-rate policy. While its companies have 
stepped up acquisitions of assets abroad, they have 
been careful to avoid any rash moves that could trigger 
a Washington backlash of the kind provoked in 2005 
by China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s landmark 
hostile takeover bid for Unocal, the US oil company. 
Admittedly, Beijing’s embargo since 2010  on exports 
to Japan of rare earths, of which China is almost 
the only producer, in retaliation for the arrest of a 
Chinese trawler captain in disputed waters, is an 
exception from its traditional reluctance to use trade 
as an offensive weapon. It is still unclear whether 
this is an isolated incident or presages a shift to more 
aggressive economic diplomacy. However, it has not 
stopped China, Japan and South Korea moving ahead 
with plans for a free trade agreement nor thwarted 
discussions between Beijing and Tokyo on possible 
currency cooperation.
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In any case, the export restrictions have so far proved 
ineffectual and may yet be self-defeating. Not only 
have they failed to cut off Japan’s access to rare earths, 
which are freely smuggled out of China; the sharp price 
rise caused by Beijing’s actions has spurred investment 
in production elsewhere that may in time break China’s 
near-monopoly over supply of the minerals.
CHINA’S FINANCIAL TRAP
None of the trappings of supposed Chinese power 
excites greater international attention or discussion 
than its fi nancial resources and, in particular, its massive 
foreign exchange reserves. These are frequently 
held up, at home and abroad, as emblematic of the 
country’s economic strength and of its emergence as 
a heavyweight player on the global stage.
Yet that is not a view apparently shared by China’s rich, 
many of whom seem to lack confi dence in the future 
of its economy. Offi cial as well as unoffi cial evidence 
suggests that wealthy individuals are smuggling 
ever larger sums abroad, while a survey of Chinese 
millionaires last year found that more than half wanted 
to emigrate in search of a better life.
Contrary to received wisdom, China’s foreign exchange 
reserves are only partly a reward for economic success; 
they can equally be viewed as the product of skewed 
policies that have inhibited its economic performance. 
Their value has been swollen by large balance of 
payments surpluses that have built up since the early 
period of this century. These stem in part from net 
export earnings and capital infl ows, but their principal 
cause is structural: a persistent excess of domestic 
savings over investment. Put another way, China’s 
external surpluses have been acquired at the price 
of repressing domestic living standards. 
There are several reasons for China’s exceptionally high 
savings ratio. They include lack of a comprehensive 
social security system, which induces households to 
make precautionary savings to pay for retirement 
and ill-health; failure to tax and require dividend 
payments from state-owned enterprises; and 
a high savings rate by the government itself. 
Though Beijing acknowledges the need to tackle 
these challenges, it is moving only gradually to do so.
The reserves are dead money as far as China’s own 
development is concerned, contributing nothing to 
national prosperity. They cannot in practice be spent at 
home, because converting them into renminbi would 
either trigger higher infl ation or put strong upward 
pressure on the exchange rate – both outcomes that 
the government is anxious to avoid. They therefore 
have to be invested abroad.
However, fi nding a home for more than $3,000 billion 
is not easy. Few fi nancial markets are large or liquid 
enough to absorb such vast sums easily – and most 
are in the West. As a big market player, furthermore, 
China cannot switch out of investments rapidly 
without risking substantial losses on them – and 
consequent fi erce criticism from nationalistic sections 
of public opinion and the Communist party that view 
the reserves as precious patrimony.
The euro crisis has sharpened the dilemma. With 
as much as one quarter of its reserves in euro-
denominated assets, China has a big stake in the 
health of the single currency. On the other hand, it is 
clearly reluctant to increase its exposure by propping 
up troubled, and in some cases insolvent, eurozone 
members through further large-scale purchases of 
their sovereign bonds – especially as their neighbours 
are balking at doing so.
In that sense, China is caught in a trap, to a considerable 
extent of its own making. It is less master than victim 
of circumstance, confronted with an array of awkward 
choices that circumscribe its room for manoeuvre. 
An emerging giant, maybe, but in some respects a 
muscle-bound one.
In search of an escape route and, in particular, of 
ways of reducing dependence on the US dollar, China 
is taking steps to promote international use of the 
renminbi. They include agreements with selected 
partners to use the currency to fi nance bilateral trade 
(chiefl y China’s imports), the launch of an offshore ‘dim 
sum’ bond market in Hong Kong, and authorisation 
of limited purchases of domestic Chinese bonds by 
Japanese investors.
So far, investors’ response to these initiatives has 
been lukewarm. Not only do they appear to meet no 
strong commercial need, but they have offered little 
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opportunity for profi t and in some cases have been a 
recipe for losses. Indeed, market demand appears to 
have been heavily inspired by speculative short-term 
expectations of a further appreciation of China’s 
currency and has subsided as those expectations 
have ebbed.
It is, in any case, unclear how much ‘internationalisation’ 
can achieve as long as China’s extensive capital controls 
keep the renminbi unconvertible. A fi rst, tentative step 
was made to address this issue in April, by widening 
the band within which the currency is allowed to 
fl uctuate. However, moving to full convertibility 
could place enormous strains on China’s primitive 
and ossifi ed fi nancial system, unless it were fi rst 
radically overhauled and modernised. That may well 
be the real agenda of the policymakers promoting 
the ‘internationalisation’ of the renminbi, in the hope 
that it will increase pressure on a reluctant and divided 
Chinese leadership to launch the reforms needed to 
improve the effi ciency of capital allocation and remove 
the severe distortions the system generates.
If so, they face potentially formidable obstacles. 
One is predictable resistance from powerful interest 
groups that benefi t from the current system: local 
governments ; the banks for which it guarantees fat 
profi t margins; and the state-owned enterprises for 
which it provides capital on preferential terms. More 
important still is opposition from conservatives in 
the political establishment who argue that fi nancial 
liberalisation would not only destabilise the economy 
but, even more crucially, rob the Communist party of 
a vital lever of control.
Such arguments between liberalisers and conservatives 
extend well beyond the fi nancial sphere. They are at 
the heart of the violent internal party confl icts waged 
in advance of the transition to a new leadership later 
this year. Their outcome is still unclear, but it seems 
certain to be of huge, possibly decisive, importance 
for the future conduct of Chinese economic policies, 
abroad as well as at home. 
CONCLUSION
For three decades, China’s approach to international 
affairs has been shaped by one over-arching 
imperative: the pursuit of rapid economic growth 
and development at home. That has placed a premium 
on maintaining stable external relations, above all 
with the US, while avoiding the distraction of foreign 
entanglements and leaving others to shoulder the 
burdens of global leadership.
The approach has served China well, freeing it to 
focus on pressing domestic priorities and challenges. 
However, it has also bred a distinctly inward-looking 
attitude that has prized preserving the status quo 
abroad and minimising the impact of disruptive 
external events at home. What China expects or 
desires from the world, beyond international respect 
and the fulfi lment of its immediate material needs, 
remains unclear: Beijing is decidedly better at saying 
what it does not want than at identifying what it does.
Chinese diplomacy, likewise, has been ruled by the 
self-interested axiom of ‘non-intervention’ in other 
countries’ external affairs – though how far it has been 
honoured in practice is debatable. Beijing has relied 
heavily for infl uence, especially in other developing 
countries, not on ‘soft power’ – a commodity in 
limited supply in China – but on the hard currency 
of money, investment, commerce and the promise 
of material gain.
Furthermore, in contrast to the US, China has few 
close allies, and those that it has – such as Burma and 
North Korea – have long counted among the world’s 
undesirables. Its intentions often inspire suspicion 
elsewhere, and relations with fellow members of 
the BRICS are marked as much by differences as by 
common ground, preventing them from uniting even 
behind a candidate to head the World Bank. The 
fate of proposals to set up their own development 
bank and stand together in the IMF, discussed at the 
BRICS’ summit in March, will be a test of whether 
their solidarity is more than rhetorical.
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All this has left China cutting a somewhat isolated 
fi gure on the world stage, deliberately shying away 
from active engagement in issues that do not impinge 
directly and immediately on its most obvious national 
interests. That seems a narrow and unpromising 
platform from which to launch a bid to become the 
world’s dominant power.
However, perhaps the most relevant question for the 
future is not whether China possesses the ambition 
or the capacity to achieve that goal. It is whether it 
can avoid being drawn into accepting more global 
responsibilities than it has so far been prepared 
to exercise – and how well it is equipped to carry 
them out.
The reason it may need to is, simply, that China’s 
growing importance and its accelerating integration 
with the global economy will compel it. Not only 
does the impact of its own actions increasingly 
reverberate around the world, but its dependence on 
foreign sources of raw materials, energy, technology 
and markets increasingly expose it to complex and 
often unpredictable political developments beyond 
its own borders.
Relying on opportunistic use of the chequebook to 
further national economic interests, while sheltering 
on the diplomatic sidelines, is likely to become harder 
when, as in the Middle East, those interests can 
suddenly be placed in jeopardy by violent political 
upheavals. Equally, China’s large stake in an open 
world trade system ought to provide an incentive to 
work more energetically to strengthen it, especially 
if it is threatened by a resurgence of protectionism.
Addressing these challenges would require making 
choices of a very different and more complex kind than 
those to which China is accustomed. It would also 
mean articulating a more wide-ranging and forward-
looking vision of national self-interest that went 
beyond short-term expediency and meeting immediate 
material needs. Over the past three decades, China has 
shown that it can shake the established world order.
 It has yet to show that it can help shape a future one. ■
